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THE UNITED STATES’ INDISPENSABILITY IN INDIAN LAND 
CLAIMS:  THE PROPER APPLICATION OF PROVIDENT 
TRADESMENS 
“Like the miner’s canary, the Indian marks the shifts from fresh air to poison 
gas in our political atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more than 
our treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic 
faith . . . .”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Indian tribes seeking to assert land claims in the United States face 
substantial hurdles.  Many present land claims have sprung from alleged 
abuses and transactions that are over two hundred years old.2  Matters of proof 
and the speculative nature of available testimony for these cases present 
significant challenges for plaintiffs.  Records may be poor and there likely 
remain no witnesses to testify.  While the passage of time makes it 
substantively difficult for Indians to prevail, procedural hurdles can make it 
impossible. 
Due to the historical link between the federal government and Indian 
tribes, a significant number of Indian land claims implicate some action by the 
United States.3  Where this is so, defendants may argue that the United States 
must be joined in the litigation since its acts are under scrutiny.  Courts must 
then analyze whether the United States is a necessary or indispensable party. 
A four-factor test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in 
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson4 guides this 
determination.  First, a court must consider whether the nature of the litigation 
and the parties means the United States should be joined, if possible.5  If the 
court makes such a determination, then the United States is a necessary party.6  
However, if the United States cannot be joined—perhaps due to its sovereign 
 
 1. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, v (1982). 
 2. See, e.g., Miami Tribe of Okla. v. Walden, No. 00-cv-4142-JPG (S.D. Ill. filed June 2, 
2000). 
 3. See, e.g., Navajo Tribe v. New Mexico, 809 F.2d 1455 (10th Cir. 1987), discussed infra 
notes 161-200 and accompanying text. 
 4. 390 U.S. 102 (1968). 
 5. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a). 
 6. See Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Wisconsin, 879 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(declaring the United States a necessary, rather than indispensable, party). 
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immunity—the court must consider whether the suit can properly be 
adjudicated in the United States’ absence.  If the court determines the suit 
cannot be resolved without the United States’ presence, then the United States 
is an indispensable party, and the suit must be dismissed.7 
A number of Indian land claims have required a determination of whether 
the United States was an indispensable party.  Four of these, Navajo Tribe v. 
New Mexico,8 Lee v. United States,9 Nichols v. Rysavy10 and Sokaogon 
Chippewa Community v. Wisconsin,11 are particularly significant.  Although 
these cases were decided within only two years of each other, the courts used 
different processes to determine whether the United States was an 
indispensable party.  In Navajo Tribe, Lee and Nichols, where the United 
States could not be joined, the courts ruled the United States was an 
indispensable party.12  In Sokaogon Chippewa, however, where the United 
States also could not be joined, the court ruled the United States was not an 
indispensable party and the litigation was allowed to continue.13  A case 
recently filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Illinois, Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. Walden,14 raised the issue of the United 
States’ indispensability in Indian land claims once again.15  These cases 
present an opportunity to evaluate the application of the Provident Tradesmens 
test. 
This Comment analyzes the process applied in Navajo Tribe, Lee, Nichols 
and Sokaogon Chippewa for determining indispensability and offers a 
prediction of how the court might rule in Miami.  It also serves as a general 
introduction to the substantial obstacles Indians face when pursuing land 
claims. 
Part II provides a brief overview of the federal government’s role in 
American Indian history, noting specifically policy that influenced Indian land 
rights over the past 200 years.  Part III outlines the history and operation of the 
 
 7. See, e.g., Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1471. 
 8. Id. at 1455. 
 9. 809 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 10. 809 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 11. 879 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 12. See Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1472-73; Lee, 809 F.2d at 1411; Nichols, 809 F.2d at 
1332-34. 
 13. See Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 305. 
 14. Miami Tribe of Okla. v. Walden, No. 00-cv-4142-JPG (S.D. Ill. filed June 2, 2000). 
 15. The author became familiar with the Miami’s claim while working at Dankenbring, 
Greiman & Osterholt, L.L.P. (now Spencer, Fane, Britt & Browne, L.L.P.) from 2000 to 2001.  
The firm represented the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma at one point in the litigation.  The views 
expressed herein are not necessarily those of Dankenbring Greiman & Osterholt, L.L.P., Spencer 
Fane Britt & Browne, L.L.P. or the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma.  In June, 2001, the Miami dropped 
the suit. 
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rule on indispensable parties, set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and interpreted by the Supreme Court in Provident Tradesmens.16  Part IV 
introduces some of the guiding principles regarding the federal government’s 
sovereign immunity, which are often raised as a barrier to Indian claims. 
Part V presents cases that considered whether the United States was an 
indispensable party where sovereign immunity threatened the continuation of 
an Indian land claim.17  The Miami claim is also presented in detail at Part V, 
and an analysis is set forth of how Provident Tradesmens might be applied to 
the facts in Miami.18  Finally, Part VI offers a conclusion on the matters with 
which courts should most concern themselves when faced with an 
indispensability ruling in an Indian land claim. 
II.  THE HISTORIC LINK BETWEEN INDIANS AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
American Indians’ history has been significantly impacted by the federal 
government’s actions.19  Occupying, as they do, a quasi-sovereign position in 
American federalism, somewhere between a State and a foreign nation, the 
courts and Congress have grappled with how to appropriately fashion Indian 
rights and remedies.20  This struggle has produced conflicting decisions and 
backpedaling by Congress as the federal government moved from one policy to 
the next, attempting to determine how to treat the Indian within the American 
system.21 
A familiar starting point in the history of the United States’ relationship 
with Indians is the trilogy of opinions penned by Chief Justice John Marshall: 
Johnson v. M’Intosh,22 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia23 and Worcester v. 
Georgia.24  These cases represent significant declarations of early Indian 
policy and prepared the foundation upon which subsequent Indian 
 
 16. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b). 
 17. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d 300; Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d 1455; Lee, 809 F.2d 1406; 
Nichols, 809 F.2d 1317. 
 18. Mark R. Scherer argues that more studies of the effects of government policy on 
individual tribes “are needed because only at the grassroots level can the tangible, human effects 
of the shifting tides of federal policy be truly assessed.”  See MARK R. SCHERER, IMPERFECT 
VICTORIES: THE LEGAL TENACITY OF THE OMAHA TRIBE 1945-1995 xi (1999). 
 19. Somewhat confusing, however, given their link with the federal government, is the 
considerable lack of access Indians have had to judicial remedies.  See, e.g., H. D. ROSENTHAL, 
THEIR DAY IN COURT: A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION 12 (1990) (noting that 
from 1863-1881 the Court of Claims was closed to Indians, blocking their efforts to obtain 
redress for past injustices). 
 20. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); infra note 56. 
 21. See SCHERER, supra note 18, at xi. 
 22. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
 23. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1. 
 24. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
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jurisprudence in the United States rests.25  They provided the opportunity for 
Chief Justice Marshall to establish the extent of Indian land rights vis-a-vis the 
federal government’s rights,26 to rule on whether an Indian had standing to sue 
in federal court27 and to determine the extent of a state’s jurisdiction over tribal 
lands.28 
United States Indian policy did not originate with these three cases, 
however.  Just as Chief Justice Marshall analyzed the Indians’ land rights in 
Johnson only after a review of the doctrine of discovery and colonial 
interactions with the Indians, a proper survey of the origins of the federal 
government’s relationship with Indians begins with a review of colonial 
institutions and policies.29 
A. The Colonial and Early National Years 
The American colonies signed treaties with Indians beginning as early as 
Roger Williams’ settlement of Rhode Island in 1636.30  The practice of 
entering into treaties with Indians for land was based on three assumptions: 
first, that both parties were sovereigns;31 second, that the Indians had some sort 
of transferable title and; third, that the transfer of Indian lands must be 
transacted by the government, rather than individuals.32  These assumptions 
leant credibility to a process under which land was acquired from Indians only 
with their consent.33 
In the early colonial years, it was important that Indians were dealt with 
prudently because, if for no other reason, they outnumbered the colonists.34  
Because of their desire to deal fairly with the Indians, the majority of lands the 
 
 25. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382 (1886) (citing Cherokee Nation 
and Worcester). 
 26. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 604-05 (holding Indian transfer of real property to any party other 
than the United States was unenforceable). 
 27. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20 (holding the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction 
over Cherokee Indians since they were not a foreign nation). 
 28. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 595-96 (holding a person within the Cherokee reservation was not 
subject to the laws of Georgia). 
 29. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 572-603.  This discussion compromises the bulk of the Johnson 
opinion. 
 30. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 47 (1945) [hereinafter COHEN 
FIRST ED.]. 
 31. See generally Stephen B. Young, Indian Tribal Sovereignty and American Fiduciary 
Undertakings, 8 WHITTIER L. REV. 825 (1987), for a discussion of the necessity of recognizing a 
measure of sovereignty in the Indians. 
 32. COHEN FIRST ED., supra note 30, at 47.  It was also Rhode Island where the potential 
abuse of individual colonists entering into unauthorized treaties with Indians for the purpose of 
purchasing their land first prompted a prohibition of such treaties in 1651.  Id. 
 33. COHEN, supra note 1, at 53. 
 34. Id. at 55. 
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colonies obtained from them were through purchase, rather than treaty.35  
Later, during the French and Indian War, the British government assumed 
more control over dealings with the Indians.36  Although the Crown played an 
important role in preserving peace between the Indians and border settlers, the 
colonies returned to negotiating with the Indians following the war.37 
In Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall noted that after the 
Revolutionary War the United States continued the native-“potentate” 
relationship that the British had established.38  After the war, the administration 
of the Articles of Confederation failed to grant the federal government the 
authority needed to effectively manage Indian affairs.39  Upon ratification of 
the Constitution, however, the individual colonies transferred their authority to 
deal with Indians to the federal government.40 
The Constitution establishes that Indian commerce is the exclusive domain 
of the federal government.41  Apart from mention of Indians with respect to 
taxation and representation,42 the “Indian Commerce Clause”43 is the only 
reference to Native Americans in the original document.44  Though it does not 
mention Indians, the treaty power45 also provides authority for the federal 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 57. 
 37. Id. at 57-58. 
 38. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 555 (1832). 
[T]he extinguishment of the British power . . . and the establishment of that of the United 
States in its place led naturally to the declaration, on the part of the Cherokees, that they 
were under the protection of the United States, and of no other power.  They assumed the 
relation with the United States, which had before subsisted with Great Britain. 
Id. 
 39. See id. at 558-59 (noting that “ambiguous phrases [following] the grant of power to the 
United States, were so construed by the states of North Carolina and Georgia as to annul the 
power [to regulate Indian commerce and affairs]”). 
 40. See id. at 559.  The Constitution 
confers on congress the powers of war and peace; of making treaties, and of regulating 
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.  
These powers comprehend all that is required for the regulation of our intercourse with 
the Indiana [sic].  They are not limited by any restrictions on their free actions.  The 
shackles imposed on this power, in the confederation, are discarded. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 8. 
 41. Id. § 8, cl. 3. 
 42. Id. § 2, cl. 3. 
 43. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 208.  For a discussion of whether the Major Crimes Act of 
1885 had its constitutional basis in the Indian Commerce Clause, see United States v. Kagama, 
118 U.S. 375 (1886), discussed infra Part II.C. 
 44. But see Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378 (noting Indians mentioned in Fourteenth Amendment). 
 45. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  See also United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 
188, 197 (1876) (holding power to make treaties with Indians coextensive with that to make 
treaties with foreign nations). 
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government’s actions with respect to Indians.46  While it includes powers that 
the federal government might exercise over Indians, the Constitution provides 
a less-than-complete description of the proper relationship between the 
government and the Indians.47  Thus the relationship, as it evolved early in the 
United States’ history, was described as “an anomalous one, and of a complex 
character,”48 and “marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist no 
where else.”49 
B. The Marshall Opinions 
In Cherokee Nation and Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall had an 
opportunity to define the amorphous boundaries of the United States’ 
relationship with Indians.  These cases are recognized as the origins of the 
federal government’s “trust relationship” or “guardian role” over Indians.50  
Before Chief Justice Marshall could develop this concept, however, he had to 
determine the status of Indian nations within the federalism sphere.  He did so 
in Cherokee Nation. 
Marshall noted the unique issues raised by the case,51 but felt constrained 
to first address the matter of the Court’s jurisdiction.52  If the Cherokees were 
not a foreign nation, the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case.53  Finding 
that the Framers clearly separated Indians from foreign nations,54 the Court 
 
 46. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 207-08. 
 47. Justice Miller observed that “[t]he constitution of the United States is almost silent in 
regard to the relations of the government which was established by it to the numerous tribes of 
Indians within its borders.”  Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378. 
 48. Id. at 381. 
 49. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831). 
 50. See, e.g., Janice Aitken, The Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law: A Look at Its 
Development and at How Its Analysis Under Social Contract Theory Might Expand Its Scope, 18 
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 115, 115-16 (1997); Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the 
Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1213 (1975). 
 51. “If courts were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case better calculated to excite 
them can scarcely be imagined.”  Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15.  The Cherokee Nation brought 
suit against the State of Georgia to enjoin it from enforcing its laws within lands designated to the 
plaintiffs under treaties with the United States.  Id. 
 52. “Before we look into the merits of the case, a preliminary inquiry presents itself.  Has 
this court jurisdiction of the cause?”  Id.  In other cases, Marshall chose to address the matter of 
the Court’s jurisdiction only after discussing other issues.  See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 53. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15-16. 
 54. The Cherokee Nation’s attorneys set forth the argument that the separation of Indian 
tribes from States and foreign nations in Article III was an attempt to clarify the federal 
government’s power in the area, since the Articles of Confederation had conferred no such power, 
but not to separate them from “foreign nation” status.  Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 18.  Marshall 
answered this by pointing out that the Framer’s would have used language such as “to regulate 
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held “that an Indian tribe or nation within the United States [is] not a foreign 
state in the sense of the constitution, and cannot maintain an action in the 
courts of the United States.”55  The unique position the Indians occupied was 
not due solely to their status as something more than a State and less than a 
foreign nation, but also their dependency on the federal government.56  The 
United States’ guardian role developed from this recognition.57 
To support the federal government’s role as guardian from the States,58 it 
was necessary to acknowledge that the Indians possessed some measure of 
sovereignty.59  Without the recognition of Indian sovereignty, the exercise of 
power by the United States would be one of conqueror, rather than protector.60  
In Cherokee Nation, Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged the powerful 
position the Indians had once occupied in North America, but admitted that 
they had gradually sunk “beneath our superior policy, our arts, and our 
arms.”61  As a consequence, the Indians “yielded their lands by successive 
treaties, each of which contained a solemn guarantee of the residue . . . .”62 
Once Marshall recognized a measure of sovereignty in the Indians, he 
could structure his description of the relationship of the federal government to 
the Indians in affirmative terms.  The Indians “acknowledge themselves in their 
treaties to be under the protection of the United States; they admit that the 
United States shall have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade 
with them, and managing all their affairs as they think proper . . . .”63 
This language attributing sovereignty to the Indians was critical for the 
creation of the federal government’s trust relationship with Indians.  Without 
 
commerce with foreign nations, including the Indian tribes, and among the several states.”  Id. at 
19 (emphasis added). 
 55. Id. at 20. 
 56. Marshall observed that the Indians were neither a state nor a foreign nation: “In [the 
Indian Commerce Clause] they are as clearly contradistinguished by a name appropriate to 
themselves, from foreign nations, as from the several states composing the union.”  Id. at 18. 
 57. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 555 (1832). 
 58. See infra note 94. 
 59. See generally Young, supra note 31. 
 60. But see Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (leaning heavily on the 
doctrine of discovery and concept of the sovereign conqueror).  Ultimately the distinction 
between protector and conqueror can be viewed as one hinging on which entity derives the most 
benefit from the relationship. 
 61. Cherokee, 30 U.S. at 15. 
 62. Id.  It was that residue which the Cherokee Nation sought to protect in its appearance 
before the Supreme Court.  Id. 
 63. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).  Moreover, as Marshall sorted through the argument that the 
Indians were not foreign nations, he phrased his description in a manner which recognized the 
Indians’ sovereignty: “[T]he Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and, 
heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a 
voluntary cession to our government . . . .”  Id. (emphasis added). 
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recognition of the inherent sovereignty of the Indians, there could be no 
legitimacy in the Indians yielding a portion of that sovereignty to the federal 
government.64  To phrase it contractually, if the Indians had not yielded a 
portion of their sovereignty, then there was no consideration to support the 
United States’ return promise of protection from the States.65 
Just as the recognition of some measure of sovereignty in the Indians was 
necessary, so too was an explanation of the Indians’ dependence on the United 
States.66  In Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall explained that “[t]he Indian 
nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some foreign 
potentate for the supply of their essential wants . . . .”67  The relationship, he 
continued, was to be “that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of 
one more powerful,” rather than one of a nation “submitting as subjects to the 
laws of a master.”68  Thus, the guardian-ward relationship was established.69  
Although Cherokee Nation and Worcester created a foundation for the exercise 
of the federal government’s power with respect to Indians, the exercise thereof 
would fundamentally change in subsequent years. 
C. The Federal Government Increasingly Exercises Its Power Over Indians 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the transformation of the 
United States’ relationship with the Indians from guardian to complete 
sovereign became increasingly noticeable.70  In 1871, Congress discontinued 
 
 64. See generally Young, supra note 31. 
 65. Justice Thompson’s dissent in Cherokee took issue with the concurrence of Justices 
Johnson and Baldwin, which emphasized the conquered status of the Cherokee people.  
Chambers, supra note 50, at 1216-17.  Thompson’s opinion “argued that the Cherokees were not 
a conquered people, but an unequal and inferior ally bound by a contractual arrangement (the 
treaty) to a more powerful protector nation.”  Id. at 1217. 
 66. Recognition of the dependence of the Indians is also used in Kagama as a justification 
for Justice Miller’s expansion of the power of the federal government over Indians.  See infra 
note 94 and accompanying text. 
 67. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 555 (1832).  Here Marshall explained, inter 
alia, the articles of the Treaty of Hopewell between the United States and the Cherokees.  Id. at 
554-55. 
 68. Id. at 555. 
 69. Worcester further contributed to the establishment of a unique position for American 
Indians in its holding that ambiguous terms in a treaty should be interpreted as the Indians would 
have interpreted them.  Chambers, supra note 50, at 1214 n.11. 
 70. Whether this was really a transformation of power, or just the outward expressions 
thereof, is discussed infra note 95.  The first of the Marshall Trilogy, Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), does not comport with the establishment of the federal guardian role 
over Indians as Cherokee Nation and Worcester do.  In Johnson, a land dispute involving the sale 
of land by an Indian and the grant of the same land by the United States government presented the 
opportunity for the Court to rule on the enforceability of the transfer of land by an Indian to a 
private individual rather than the U.S. government.  21 U.S. at 571-72.  Chief Justice Marshall 
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the practice of entering into treaties with Indians.71  As a result, the exercise of 
the federal government’s power with respect to Indians could no longer be tied 
to its treaty power72 and increasingly the federal government’s action was tied 
to the authority vested through the Indian Commerce Clause.73 
United States v. Kagama,74 which considered the application of the Indian 
Commerce Clause, has been cited as the most pronounced evidence of the 
transformation of the federal government’s relationship with Indians.75  In 
Kagama, the Court considered whether the federal courts had jurisdiction over 
an Indian committing murder against another Indian on an Indian reservation.76  
The Court had faced nearly identical facts just three years earlier in Ex parte 
Crow Dog.77 
In Crow Dog, the Court ruled that the conviction of the accused was 
improper due to the Territory of Dakota District Court’s lack of jurisdiction.78  
In the past, offenses “by Indians against each other were left to be dealt with 
by each tribe for itself, according to its local customs.”79  The Court noted that 
the “policy of the government in [this] respect has been uniform”80 and that to 
uphold the jurisdiction of the district court in this situation “would be to 
reverse . . . the general policy of the government toward the Indians . . . from 
 
outlined the doctrine of discovery and cited it as one source of federal dominance and sovereignty 
with respect to which transfer would be recognized.  Id. at 572-86.  Because Johnson justifies the 
exercise of the federal government’s power with respect to Indians on the basis of the doctrine of 
discovery rather than the Indians’ dependence, it is inappropriate to label all three cases of the 
Marshall Trilogy as support for the federal government’s limited guardian role. 
 71. COHEN, supra note 1, at 208. 
 72. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 74. 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
 75. See, e.g., Aitken, supra note 50, at 116.  It is notable that two of the most significant 
periods in the development of caselaw regarding the federal government’s role with respect to 
American Indians, the early 1830’s (Cherokee Nation and Worcester) and late 1860’s through 
mid-1880’s (General Allotment Act of 1877 and Kagama), coincided with times of vigorous 
discussion regarding States’ Rights.  The Nullification Crisis came quickly on the heels of 
Cherokee Nation and Worcester and the significance of Kagama’s proximity to the 
Reconstruction Era Amendments should not be ignored.  Whether a link can be formed between 
the expression of the government’s role with respect to Indians and periods of federalism crisis 
remains to be explored elsewhere. 
 76. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 376. 
 77. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).  There a Sioux Indian murdered another Sioux in Indian country.  
Id. at 557.  For a definition of “Indian country,” see COHEN, supra note 1, at 27-28. 
 78. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 572. 
 79. Id. at 571-72. 
 80. Id. at 572. 
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the beginning to the present time.”81  The Court declined to uphold federal 
jurisdiction in the absence of a clear expression of congressional intent.82 
Congress made a clear expression of its intention in the three years 
between Crow Dog and Kagama.  In 1885 the Major Crimes Act was passed, 
extending the federal courts’ jurisdiction to all, regardless of race.83  Indians 
were now subject to federal subject matter jurisdiction even if the crime they 
committed was against another Indian or on a reservation.84  In Kagama, the 
Court was called upon to rule on the constitutionality of the Major Crimes 
Act.85 
The Court, speaking through Justice Miller, began its analysis by searching 
for Constitutional authority on the matter of the federal government’s 
relationship with Indians.86  Miller observed that “[t]he constitution of the 
United States is almost silent in regard to the relations of the government 
which was established by it to the numerous tribes of Indians within its 
borders.”87  Justice Miller further recognized the Indian Commerce Clause’s 
instructive role with respect to the federal government’s power over Indians.88  
Miller, however, quickly disposed of the possibility that the Major Crimes Act 
was founded upon the authority the Indian Commerce Clause granted 
Congress: 
[W]e think it would be a very strained construction of this clause that a system 
of criminal laws for Indians living peaceably in their reservations, which left 
out the entire code of trade and intercourse laws justly enacted under that 
provision, and established punishments for . . . [crimes,] without any reference 
to their relation to any kind of commerce, was authorized by the grant of 
power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes.89 
Following an explanation of the general sovereignty of the United States 
over those things within its borders,90 the Court explained the significance of 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 376-77 (1886).  For a description of the Act, 
see COHEN, supra note 1, at 300-04. 
 84. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 376-77. 
 85. Id. at 376. 
 86. Id. at 378. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.  See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 89. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378-79 (emphasis added). 
 90. Id. at 380. 
[T]his power of congress to organize territorial governments, and make laws for their 
inhabitants, arises, not so much from the clause in the constitution in regard to disposing 
of and making rules and regulations concerning the territory and other property of the 
United States, as from the ownership of the country in which the territories are, and the 
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the complex relationship between the United States and the Indians, using the 
opinions of Chief Justice Marshall in Cherokee Nation and Worcester.91  
Miller noted that “[i]n the opinions . . . [the Indians] are spoken of as ‘wards of 
the nation;’ ‘pupils;’ as local dependent communities.”92  His opinion declares 
the Major Crimes Act constitutional, concluding that “[t]he power of the 
general government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak 
and diminished in numbers, is seccesary [sic] to their protection, as well as to 
the safety of those among whom they dwell.”93  This statement, as well as 
others throughout the opinion, are evidence that the basis for the court’s ruling 
was the Indians’ dependency rather than the Indian Commerce Clause.94 
D. An Attempt at Recognition of and Remedies for Past Injustices Visited 
Upon Indians: The Indian Claims Commission 
With this newly defined power,95 the potential for abuse was great.96  The 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed some of the greatest 
injustices endured by Native Americans, including the Battle of Little Big 
Horn,97 the Wounded Knee Massacre98 and attempts at assimilation.99  
 
right of exclusive sovereignty which must exist in the national government, and can be 
found nowhere else. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 91. Id. at 382. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 384 (emphasis added). 
 94. See, e.g., Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384-85. 
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation.  They are communities dependent on the 
United States,— dependent largely for their daily food; dependent for their political 
rights.  They owe no allegiance to the states, and receive from them no protection.  
Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where they are found are often 
their deadliest enemies.  From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the 
course of dealing of the federal government with them, and the treaties in which it has 
been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power. 
Id. (emphasis original).  Basing the exercise of authority on the dependence of the Indians was an 
arguably broader basis upon which to legitimize the United States’ action than the Indian 
Commerce Clause. 
 95. While it is tempting to describe the power as an altogether new one, some might argue 
that the federal government’s plenary power always existed, but that it was just conceptualized in 
different ways.  But see generally Aitken, supra note 50, and Chambers, supra note 50, for an 
argument that implies the actual power of the federal government, rather than the outward 
expressions thereof, was transformed over time. 
 96. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 127-43 for a general description of this period. 
 97. See ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 146-47 (3d ed. 1991). 
 98. See generally DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE (1971). 
 99. Through assimilation the government hoped to “‘civilize’ the Indian by destroying his 
tribal society and forcing him to take his place in American society as an individual.”  
ROSENTHAL, supra note 19, at 17. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1360 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:1349 
 
Nonetheless, Indians were able to make a few modest advances.  In 1879, a 
Nebraska federal district court established Indians to be “persons” for purposes 
of Fourteenth Amendment protections, and in 1881, a presidential commission 
reopened claims courts to Indians’ suits.100  Significant barriers remained, 
however.  Although Indians petitioned Congress to allow them to bring their 
claims before the Court of Claims, the process brought much frustration, since 
“run[ning] a claim through the gauntlet of Congress and the bureaucracy was a 
tortuous, frustrating task and the results were meager.”101 
Eventually it was recognized that many Indians had legitimate legal claims 
for which there should be a remedy and that the process of forcing tribes to 
petition Congress for a special jurisdictional statute was ineffective.  In 1946, 
Congress passed the Indian Claims Commission Act (ICCA),102 which created 
a special jurisdiction to hear and dispense of these claims.103  The Indian 
Claims Commission (ICC) provided an exclusive forum for Indian claims 
accruing against the United States prior to 1946.104  If a tribe failed to bring its 
claims before the ICC in the five-year window provided by the ICCA, the 
claims were barred.105 
The ICC’s jurisdiction was extended beyond its original mandate as claims 
took longer to resolve than anticipated.106  Eventually in 1978, the ICC’s 
remaining docket was transferred to the Court of Claims.107  Many of the cases 
 
 100. Id. at 15. 
 101. Id. at 13. 
 102. 25 U.S.C. § 70 (repealed 1978). 
 103. For a description of the Indian Claims Commission see generally MICHAEL LIEDER & 
JAKE PAGE, WILD JUSTICE (1997), ROSENTHAL, supra note 19, and IRREDEEMABLE AMERICA 
(Imre Sutton ed., 1985). 
 104. For a discussion of the remedies available under the ICCA, see Sioux Tribe v. United 
States, 8 Cl. Ct. 80, 88 (Cl. Ct. 1985) (holding that in creating the ICC, “Congress established a 
special tribunal capable of awarding only money damages as the appropriate measure of 
compensation.”).  But see Navajo Tribe v. New Mexico, 809 F.2d 1455, 1465-67 (10th Cir. 1987) 
(providing examples of the ICC or its successor, the Court of Claims, hearing cases seeking other 
than money damages, including declaratory judgment as to title to land); SCHERER, supra note 
18, at 50 (“The [ICCA’s] liberal jurisdictional provisions were significantly tempered, however, 
by the limitations of the actual remedial powers exercised by the ICC.”).  For a discussion of the 
significance of the decision to award money damages, rather than to return land, see generally 
Richard Allen Nielsen, American Indian Land Claims: Land Versus Money as a Remedy, 25 U. 
FLA. L. REV. (1973).  Due to the limitation as to remedy, it may be argued that the ICC was not 
the place for a suit seeking something other than monetary damages to be brought against the 
United States.  The Claims Court’s response in Sioux Tribe and the Tenth Circuit comments in 
Navajo Tribe, however, demonstrate the opposition to this position.  See infra note 183 and 
accompanying text. 
 105. See Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1469-70. 
 106. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 19, at 234. 
 107. Id.  The Court of Claims has evolved into the present Court of Federal Claims. 
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initially filed in the five-year window ending in 1951 took over thirty years to 
resolve.108  Nonetheless, what is most significant about the ICC is that it 
represented an opportunity for Indians to redress past injustices that had been 
denied them prior to 1946. 
There are numerous, and perhaps more significant events and trends that 
punctuated the past two hundred years of Native American history.  What is 
evident, however, from those briefly catalogued here, is the considerable 
control the federal government maintained over Indian affairs.  This control, 
when combined with Indians’ unique position within the federal system, 
closely links the protection of Indian rights to the United States’ willingness to 
allow or become a party to litigation on the Indians’ behalf.109 
III.  INDISPENSABLE PARTIES 
Because of the historical interaction between the federal government and 
American Indians, the United States’ indispensability is an issue that may 
frequently arise in Indian land claims.  While a complete explanation of 
indispensable parties is beyond the scope of this Comment, the discussion 
below provides a brief introduction to the subject and may serve as the basis 
for an understanding of the significant challenge that the question of 
indispensability can raise for Indian litigants. 
A. Origins of Indispensability 
Questions of indispensability center around who must be present for 
adjudication and are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19.110  While 
the current wording has been in place since the 1966 amendment, the Rule’s 
history extends even beyond the Federal Equity Rules of 1912.111  The 
Supreme Court’s 1855 decision in Shields v. Barrow112 contributed much of 
the Rule’s language: 
Persons having an interest in the controversy, and who ought to be made 
parties, in order that the court may act on that rule which requires it decide on, 
and finally determine the entire controversy, and do complete justice, by 
adjusting all the rights involved in it.  These persons are commonly termed 
necessary parties; but if their interests are separable from those of the parties 
before the court, so that the court can proceed to a decree, and do complete and 
 
 108. See, e.g., Sioux Tribe, 8 Cl. Ct. 80 (1985). 
 109. See generally Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
 110. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19. 
 111. See 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1601, at 
7-8 (3d ed. 2001) [hereinafter 7 WRIGHT]. 
 112. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1854). 
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final justice, without affecting other persons not before the court, the latter are 
not indispensable parties.113 
The early wording of the Rule led to varying interpretations by lower 
courts and improper application of some of the Rules’ vocabulary.114  What 
resulted “was judicial concentration on ‘an inward analysis of the nature of the 
rights asserted, rather than an outward assessment of the pros and cons of 
continuing with the particular case in the face of some incompleteness of 
dramatis personae.’”115 
Among the criticisms of the Rule was the use of the terms “necessary” and 
“indispensable.”116  Some felt the “ready reliance on labels for solutions of 
particular cases” should not overshadow “a critical examination [of] the basic 
principles of required joinder.”117  Under the current Rule, courts are 
encouraged to reach decisions by balancing “pragmatic” considerations, an 
approach that is not inconsistent with Shields.118  Ultimately, what the 
Advisory Committee sought to influence were not the results of earlier cases, 
but the process the courts employed in reaching them.119 
B. The Interaction Between Rules 19(a) and 19(b) 
Because it is important to understand the distinction between a “necessary” 
and an “indispensable” party, the interaction of subsections (a) and (b) of Rule 
19 merits explanation.  Rule 19(a) dictates that a person who may be joined 
without depriving the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter shall be 
joined if: 
(1) in the person’s absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those 
already parties, or 
(2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so 
situated that the disposition of the action in the person’s absence may 
 
 113. Id. at 139. 
 114. 7 WRIGHT § 1601, at 10 (noting improper interpretation of “separable” and “affecting”). 
 115. Id. (citing Kaplan, Continuing Work on the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 362 (1967)). 
 116. See, e.g., Challenge Homes, Inc. v. Greater Naples Care Ctr., Inc., 669 F.2d 667, 669 
(11th Cir. 1982). 
 117. 7 WRIGHT § 1601, at 11 (quoting Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 
55 MICH. L. REV. 327, 328-29 (1957)).  “The factors now present in Rule 19 bear a strong 
resemblance to those suggested criteria.”  Id. at 13.  See infra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 118. 7 WRIGHT § 1601, at 16. 
 119. Id. at 13.  See also Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 
119 (1968) (noting that a court cannot declare a party indispensable until it has examined the 
circumstances of the case). 
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(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect that 
interest or 
(ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of 
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason 
of the claimed interest.120 
The court does not need to proceed to the Rule 19(b) analysis if it is 
determined a party is not one who should be joined if feasible under Rule 
19(a).121  If, however, a party who should be joined if feasible cannot become a 
party because, inter alia, joinder would defeat the court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction, then the court must decide whether “in equity and good 
conscience” the action should proceed.122  If a party is labeled indispensable, it 
means the court has determined that, upon application of the “in equity and 
good conscience” standard to four factors, the action must be dismissed.123 
Hence, a party is only declared indispensable if, after the consideration of 
the Rule 19 factors, the court determines the action cannot continue.  If, on the 
other hand, the court concludes that the action may continue without the absent 
party, then the party is not indispensable, but necessary, and its absence is not 
fatal to the suit.124  The proper application of the amended Rule’s factors was 
set forth in Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson. 
C. Provident Tradesmens 
In Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, the Supreme 
Court was faced with an early opportunity to interpret and apply the amended 
rule on indispensability.125  The Provident Tradesmens litigation was the result 
of a car accident that occurred when Edward Dutcher’s car, driven by Donald 
Cionci, crossed a median and collided with a truck.126  Three people were 
 
 120. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a).  See generally 7 WRIGHT § 1604. 
 121. 7 WRIGHT § 1607, at 84. 
 122. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b).  An example of a jurisdiction-defeating circumstance would be the 
sovereign immunity of one of the parties, discussed infra Part III.A. 
 123. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b). 
The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment 
rendered in the person’s absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already 
parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the 
shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, 
whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the 
plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
Id. 
 124. See, e.g., Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty.  v. Wisconsin, 879 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 125. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968). 
 126. Id. at 104. 
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killed and one was injured.127  The court questioned whether Dutcher needed to 
be present for litigation between the respective insurance companies.128 
In proceedings before the district court, Dutcher was limited in his 
testimony as to whether Cionci had permission to use the car due to 
Pennsylvania’s “Dead Man Rule.”129  Under this rule, Dutcher could not testify 
against an estate if he had interests adverse to it.130  Dutcher was allowed, 
however, to testify as to the living plaintiff, John Harris.131 
The Third Circuit did not address the many state law issues raised on 
appeal,132 but reversed on an alternative ground that had not been raised 
earlier.133  This ground was that Dutcher was an indispensable party, and the 
court held that “the ‘adverse interests’ that had rendered Dutcher incompetent 
to testify under the Pennsylvania Dead Man Rule also required him to be made 
a party.”134 
The Supreme Court recognized that the lower court did not follow the 
provisions of Rule 19.135  Labeling the lower court’s approach “inflexible” and 
noting that the ruling “presented a serious challenge to the scope of the newly 
amended Rule 19” and “exemplifies the kind of reasoning that the Rule was 
designed to avoid,” the Supreme Court granted certiorari.136 
The Court emphasized that the purpose of examining the four factors was 
to determine whether “in equity and good conscience” a court could proceed 
without a party.137  The Court analyzed the four factors, but, for convenience, 
presented them differently than the exact wording of the Rule.138  The Court 
considered, first, the plaintiff’s interest in the forum; second, the defendant’s 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 105-06. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 106. 
 131. Id. 
 132. The state law issues included “the fairness of submitting the question as to Harris to a 
jury that had been directed to find in favor of the two estates whose position was factually 
indistinguishable . . . .”  Id. at 106 n.1. 
 133. Id. at 106. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 106-07. 
 136. Id. at 107. 
 137. Id. at 109. 
 138. Id. at 110 n.2.  The Court noted that its list followed that presented in Reed, supra note 
117, at 330.  For a listing of the factors as contained in Rule 19, see supra note 123 and 
accompanying text.  See also 7 WRIGHT § 1602, at 19-20 (pointing out that although Provident 
Tradesmens ordered the factors differently, courts are still required to take into account “much the 
same elements when deciding a compulsory-joinder question”). 
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wish to avoid multiple litigation;139 third, the interests of the “outsider” who 
may be indispensable; and fourth, the interest of the courts and the public in 
“complete, consistent, and efficient settlement of controversies.”140 
In its analysis, the Court paid particular attention to the third factor: the 
interests of the outsider who may be indispensable.141  The Court explained 
that “since the outsider is not before the court, he cannot be bound by the 
judgment rendered,” but that this did not mean “a court may never issue a 
judgment that, in practice, affects a nonparty.”142  The Court noted that, 
notwithstanding this, a court was obliged to consider the interests of 
nonparties.143  The essential question, the Court explained, was whether a 
judgment in the absence of the party would “impair or impede” that party’s 
ability to protect its interest in the subject matter.144  Finally, the Court 
acknowledged that the Rule granted courts the flexibility to shape relief in a 
manner that would accommodate the interests articulated in the Rule’s four 
factors.145 
The Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeal’s contention that an 
indispensable party was a category defined by substantive law and that the 
definition could not be altered by rule.146  It held that “whether a particular 
lawsuit must be dismissed in the absence of that person . . . can only be 
determined in the context of the particular litigation.”147  Because a court 
 
 139. For the second factor, the Court noted more specifically that it goes to the defendant’s 
“wish to avoid multiple litigation, or inconsistent relief, or sole responsibility for a liability he 
shares with another.”  Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 110. 
 140. Id. at 109-12.  Throughout its discussion of the Rule 19 factors, the Court explained 
application at both the trial and appellate levels.  Id. 
 141. Id. at 110-11. 
 142. Id. at 110. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 110. 
 145. Id. at 111.  Justice Harlan noted that “[h]ad the Court of Appeals applied Rule 19’s 
criteria to the facts of the present case, it could hardly have reached the conclusion it did.”  Id. at 
112.  In reversing, Justice Harlan particularly noted that the Court of Appeals could have 
fashioned appropriate relief if it was concerned with the threat to Dutcher.  Id. at 115.  The 
opinion also explained that, with respect to the fourth factor, once the litigation had reached the 
appellate stage, the influence of the preference for efficiency “had entirely disappeared: there was 
no reason then to throw away a valid judgment just because it did not theoretically settle the 
whole controversy.”  Id. at 116. 
 146. Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 116-17. 
 147. Id. at 118.  The court further noted that there was no “prescribed formula for determining 
in every case” whether a party was indispensable.  Id. at 118 n.14 (quoting Niles-Bement-Pond 
Co. v. Iron Moulders’ Union Local No. 68, 254 U.S. 77, 80 (1920)). “The decision whether to 
dismiss . . .must be based on factors varying with the different cases, some such factors being 
substantive, some procedural, some compelling by themselves, and some subject to balancing 
against opposing interests.”  Id. at 118-19. 
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cannot know “whether a particular person is ‘indispensable’ until it ha[s] 
examined the situation to determine whether it can proceed without him,” a 
ruling on indispensability compels the court to consider the merits of the 
case.148 
IV.  FEDERAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
The four factors of the indispensability analysis, as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court in Provident Tradesmens, provide a framework for considering 
a case’s merits.  One of the issues that may arise while engaging in an analysis 
of a case’s merits with respect to indispensability is the federal government’s 
sovereign immunity. 
The United States’ sovereign immunity protects it from being named a 
defendant without its consent.149  Federal sovereign immunity has long been 
recognized, and draws its origins from England, where the King could do no 
wrong.150  Although criticized for violating the principle that no one is above 
the law, sovereign immunity is justified on several grounds.151  One such 
justification is that the government would be hindered were it subject to 
liability for every injury it caused.152  Another justification is that sovereign 
immunity “furthers the separation of powers by limiting judicial oversight of 
executive conduct.”153 
The federal government may waive its sovereign immunity, but this waiver 
must be clear.154  The waiver must take the form of federal legislation, for the 
executive branch may not consent to suit.155  In Indian land claims, courts have 
been required to interpret statutes that govern the federal government’s 
 
 148. Id. at 119. 
 149. Overton v. United States, 74 F.Supp.2d 1034, 1038 (D.N.M. 1999).  See generally 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 589-612 (3d ed. 1999). 
 150. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 149, at 590. 
 151. Id. at 590-91. 
 152. See The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 153-54 (1868), cited in CHEMERINSKY, supra note 
149, at 590 n.8. 
 153. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 149, at 590.  Chemerinsky notes Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’ justification for the United States’ sovereign immunity: “[C]laiming a right to sue the 
government is ‘like shaking one’s fist at the sky, when the sky furnishes the energy that enables 
one to raise the fist.’”  Id. at 591 (citing Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907)). 
 154. See generally John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear 
Statement Rules, 4 WIS. L. REV. 771 (1995). 
 155. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 149, at 589-90.  Such legislation has arisen in Miami Tribe of 
Okla. v. Walden, No. 00-cv-4142-JPG (S.D. Ill. filed June 2, 2000), discussed infra Part V.F.  On 
February 28, 2001, Illinois Congressman Tim Johnson introduced a bill that would allow the 
Miami Tribe of Oklahoma to sue the United States in the Court of Federal Claims.  H.R. 791, 
107th Cong. (2001). 
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relationship with Indians to determine whether these statutes amount to a 
waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity.156 
The United States’ sovereign immunity plays a significant role when 
questions of joinder arise.  Although a determination that the United States is a 
necessary party requires that it be joined if possible, sovereign immunity may 
make joinder impossible.  If the court then determines the United States did not 
waive its sovereign immunity, the court must evaluate whether the federal 
government is indispensable. 
The federal government’s sovereign immunity is especially critical when 
considering the rights asserted by American Indians.  Because their history is 
inextricably tied to the actions of the United States, many suits brought by 
Indians will implicate the interests of the United States.157  These interests 
include present-day interests the United States might have in, for instance, real 
property,158 or the United States’ interest in not subjecting itself to liability for 
past actions.159  Because of the barrier it presents for joinder, the federal 
government’s sovereign immunity will often require courts to rule on whether 
the United States is indispensable. 
V.  FEDERAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: A POTENTIALLY FATAL BLOW FOR 
INDIAN LAND CLAIMS 
A number of cases have presented the issue of whether the United States is 
an indispensable party in litigation implicating Indian land interests.  Four such 
cases, decided over a two-year period, provide examples of different 
approaches to the indispensability analysis and different results.160 
A. Navajo Tribe v. New Mexico 
In 1907 President Theodore Roosevelt added approximately 1.9 million 
acres to reservation lands of the Navajo Indians in Arizona and New 
Mexico.161  President Roosevelt intended, however, for the reservation of these 
 
 156. See, e.g., Nichols v. Rysavy, 809 F.2d 1317, 1325-26 (8th Cir. 1987) (determining 
Indian General Allotment Act was not waiver of United States’ sovereign immunity). 
 157. See supra Part II. 
 158. See, e.g., Navajo Tribe v. New Mexico, 809 F.2d 1455, 1472-73 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting 
“large holding of land claimed by the United States in this case”). 
 159. See, e.g., Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Wisconsin, 879 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(“[The United States] must not fear the consequences of a judgment in this suit.”). 
 160. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d 300; Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d 1455; Lee v. United States, 
809 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987); Nichols v. Rysavy, 809 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 161. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1457.  For a discussion of executive order reservations 
generally, see COHEN, supra note 1, at 127-28.  See generally Note, Tribal Property Interests in 
Executive-Order Reservations: A Compensable Indian Right, 69 YALE L.J. 627 (1960). 
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lands to be temporary.162  In keeping with the Indian policy du jour,163 the land 
would be allotted to the Indians individually and then the surplus would be 
opened to the public domain.164 
Soon after President Roosevelt designated the Navajo land, a New Mexico 
congressman introduced a joint resolution that would return all unallotted lands 
to the public domain.165  The final version of the resolution provided that 
“whenever the President is satisfied that all the Indians in any part of the 
[Navajo reservation] . . . have been allotted, the surplus lands in such part of 
the reservation shall be restored to the public domain . . . by proclamation of 
the President.”166 
Near the end of 1908, President Roosevelt restored all unallotted lands 
within the Navajo reservation, with the exception of 110 unapproved 
allotments, to the public domain.167  In 1911, President Taft restored additional 
lands within the reservation.168  The United States thereafter issued patents on 
part of the restored lands to the State of New Mexico and others.169 
In Navajo Tribe v. New Mexico, the plaintiff tribe sought to affirm its title 
to lands within its reservation.170  The tribe sought a declaratory judgment that 
the United States had breached its fiduciary duty to the tribe by restoring 
reservation land to the public domain through President Roosevelt’s actions of 
1908 and 1911.171  The tribe argued “that the Executive Orders were null and 
void, because they . . . [returned] the unallotted land to the public domain” 
before all the Navajos were first granted an allotment.172 
The district court dismissed the suit against the United States, holding that 
the tribe’s claims were barred because the tribe failed to pursue them under the 
ICCA.173  The district court then held the suit could not proceed against the 
remaining defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) “in the 
absence of the United States as grantor of the patents” through which the 
remaining defendants derived title.174 
 
 162. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1457-58. 
 163. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 164. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1458.  For a discussion of allotment, see generally D.S. OTIS, 
THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS (1973). 
 165. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1458. 
 166. Id. at 1459. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1457. 
 171. Id. at 1462.  In addition, the tribe sought “mesne profits and restitution of all rents, 
profits, and other income derived from the defendants’ use of the land . . . .”  Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 1462.  See supra Part II.D for a discussion of the ICC. 
 174. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1462-63. 
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On appeal, the tribe argued that their claim was not barred because the ICC 
could not hear suits brought for other than money damages.175  The tribe 
challenged, inter alia, the dismissal of the suit against not only the United 
States, but also New Mexico and the private defendants.176  After discussing 
the rationale behind the district court’s holdings,177 the court declined to decide 
whether the rationale was persuasive, and embarked upon an independent 
analysis.178 
The court found the tribe’s assertion that the ICC was “only empowered to 
hear controversies involving a ‘taking’ of land179 where Indian title was 
concededly extinguished,” a far too restrictive interpretation of the ICC’s 
jurisdiction.180  An analysis of the legislative history of the ICCA181 and a pre-
ICC case based on special Congressional jurisdiction182 led the court to 
conclude that, although the tribe would have had to accept money damages,183 
the tribe’s action to quiet title should have been brought before the ICC.184  
The court noted that the “restriction as to remedy represents a fundamental 
 
 175. Id. at 1463. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 1463-64. 
 178. Id. at 1464. 
 179. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Indian Reservation v. United States, 650 F.2d 140 (8th 
Cir. 1981), upon which “the district court relied chiefly,” involved an alleged unconstitutional 
taking under the Fifth Amendment.  Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1463. 
 180. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1464. 
 181. Id. at 1465. 
 182. Id. at 1466.  The court noted that in Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States, the plaintiff 
tribe’s claim “assert[ing] title to lands” was remedied by compensation, rather than the return of 
the land, since the lands had subsequently been open to settlement and were now in the 
possession of “innumerable innocent purchasers . . . .”  Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1466-67 (citing 
Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 272 U.S. 351, 357 (1926)).  For criticism of the heavy 
reliance the Navajo Tribe court placed on Yankton Sioux, see Richard W. Hughes, Indian Law, 18 
N.M. L. REV. 403, 412-18 (1988). 
 183. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1467.  The court further noted that “[b]y restricting the 
remedy, the [ICCA] forced the Indian to accept a post factum sale,” and that “[i]t is well within 
Congress’ power to provide a forum in which all Indian claims could be heard but to restrict the 
remedy available for such claims.”  Id. (quoting Note, Indian Breach of Trust Suits: Partial 
Justice in the Court of the Conqueror, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 502, 516-17 (1981)).  But see 
SCHERER, supra note 18, at 50 n.11 (noting that the limitation as to remedy was a decision of the 
Commission itself). 
 184. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1467.  The court dispensed with the unavailability of a remedy 
to return the land to the tribe by noting that the tribe “simply would have had to accept just 
monetary compensation if the [ICC] found their claim to title valid.”  Id.  Tribes have refused to 
accept monetary awards, holding out, instead, for the land.  See, e.g., Sioux Tribe of Indians v. 
United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 80, 87-88 (1985).  The Sioux Tribe court noted that “[a]n action seeking 
the return of their ancestral land must be maintained elsewhere,” but failing to name an available 
forum.  Id. at 88-89. 
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policy choice made by Congress out of sheer, pragmatic necessity that . . . land 
title . . . could not be disturbed because of the sorry injustices suffered by 
native Americans.”185 
In response to the tribe’s assertion that affirming the dismissal would be 
“tantamount to finding that the ICCA ‘extinguished by implication valid Indian 
titles’ and that such a finding constitute[d] ‘a backhanded assertion of eminent 
domain powers,’” the court noted that the ICCA provided a “long-overdue 
opportunity to litigate the validity of such titles and to be recompensed for 
Government actions inconsistent with those titles.”186  The court concluded the 
tribe’s cause of action against the United States accrued prior to 1946 and, 
therefore, had to be dismissed.187 
Following the affirmation of the dismissal of the claims against the United 
States, the court turned its attention to the district court’s dismissal of the 
claims against the other defendants.188  The court held it would examine the 
district court’s ruling under an “abuse of discretion” standard.189  The court 
found no such abuse and affirmed the dismissal based on the indispensability 
of the United States.190 
In making this determination, the court adopted the trial court’s reasoning 
as dispositive,191 but briefly reviewed the four factors to be considered when 
ruling on indispensability.192  The court used the four factors described in Rule 
19(b), rather than the interpretation set forth in Provident Tradesmens.193  
Upon considering whether judgment in the absence of the United States would 
be prejudicial to it or those already parties, the court remarked that “we need 
not consider any possible prejudice to other parties” because “prejudice to the 
United States is clear” and “[a] finding . . . that title . . . is vested in the [t]ribe 
 
 185. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1467.  The court noted “a major collateral concern” of 
Congress addressed in the ICCA: calming uncertainties regarding title to land.  Id. (citing Note, 
supra note 183, at 516-17). 
 186. Id. at 1469 (emphasis original).  The court then noted criticisms of statutes of limitations, 
but concluded that “[t]hey represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate.”  Id. at 1470. 
 187. Id. at 1471. 
 188. Id. at 1470-71. 
 189. Id. at 1471.  But see Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Wisconsin, 879 F.2d 300, 303-04 (7th 
Cir. 1989) (holding that due to “fell . . . consequences” of ruling on indispensability, “abuse of 
discretion” standard is improper and power of appellate court in this area should be plenary). 
 190. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1471. 
 191. Id. at 1471. 
 192. Id. at 1472.  See also supra Part III for a description of the four-factor test for 
indispensability. 
 193. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1472.  See supra note 123 and accompanying text; see also 
supra Part III.C for the factors as set forth in Provident Tradesmens. 
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when the United States claims title to much of that land undoubtedly 
prejudices the latter’s interests.”194 
When considering the second factor, the extent to which the shaping of 
relief might ameliorate prejudice to the outside party, the court held that 
“prejudice could not be lessened or avoided either through protective 
provisions . . . or through the shaping of relief [because title to the 
reservation] . . . must be decided entirely or not at all.”195  With respect to the 
third factor, the adequacy of a judgment in the third party’s absence, the court 
stated that due to the large holding of land claimed by the United States in the 
case, “a judgment rendered in its absence would not be adequate.”196 
Finally, when considering the fourth factor, whether the plaintiff would 
have an adequate remedy if the action was dismissed for nonjoinder, the court 
“concede[d] that the [t]ribe ha[d] no such remedy.”197  The court noted, 
however, that Rule 19(b) did not state the weight to be given to each factor, 
and that “the importance of each factor [must be determined] on the facts of 
each particular case and in the light of equitable considerations.”198  After this 
reference to its power of discretion, the court explained that if the tribe were 
allowed to “avoid the admittedly catastrophic effects under the ICCA of 
sleeping on its pre-1946 claim . . . the very intricate and exclusive remedial 
scheme that Congress created in the ICCA” would be undermined and the 
“interests of innocent, third-party grantees would . . . be disturbed.”199  The 
trial court’s dismissal of the claim was affirmed because, the court noted, the 
action could not proceed “in equity and good conscience.”200 
B. Lee v. United States 
Lee v. United States presented another opportunity to consider whether the 
United States was an indispensable party in an Indian land claim.  There, the 
court faced a dispute over tracts of Alaskan land201 patented to two Alaska 
Native corporations202 pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
 
 194. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1472. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 1472-73. 
 197. Id. at 1473. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Navajo Tribe, 809 F.2d at 1473. 
 200. Id. 
 201. The land at issue was located in the Eagle River Valley, near Anchorage.  Lee v. United 
States, 809 F.2d 1406, 1407 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 202. Id. at 1408 (Eklutna, Inc. and Cook Inlet Region, Inc.). 
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(ANSCA).203  The plaintiffs, three would-be homesteaders, asserted that the 
Native corporations were constructive trustees, holding the disputed land for 
their benefit.204  In addition to the two corporations, the suit also named as 
defendants the United States, the Secretary of the Interior and the Director of 
the Bureau of Land Management.205 
Prior to the lands being patented to the corporations in 1979, the Federal 
Power Commission set them aside in 1950 “as a possible site for future power 
projects.”206  Two years later, the Commission determined that the lands would 
not be adversely affected for the purpose of power development by entry into 
the public domain, but despite this determination, the land was never properly 
opened to the public domain by the Secretary of the Interior.207  Government 
agencies made clear to the plaintiffs on numerous occasions that the land that 
they claimed was within the “powersite classification” and would not be 
patented to them.208 
After dispensing with some other jurisdictional matters,209 the court turned 
to whether to affirm the district court’s dismissal of the claims against the other 
defendants due to the United States’ indispensability.210  The court ruled that 
the relief sought by the plaintiffs required the presence of the United States 
because establishing their own entitlement would require “direct proceedings 
against the United States.”211  It was not enough to show that the “patentee 
should not have received the patent; [the plaintiff] must also show that he . . . is 
entitled to it [instead].”212  The court dismissed the suit.213 
 
 203. For a further description of ANSCA, see generally Marilyn J. Ward Ford and Robert 
Rude, ANSCA: Sovereignty and a Just Settlement of Land Claims or an Act of Deception, 15 
TOURO L. REV. 479 (1999). 
 204. Lee, 809 F.2d at 1408. 
 205. Id. at 1406. 
 206. Id. at 1407. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 1407-08.  The Secretary of the Interior responded to a 1959 letter from the 
plaintiffs, “pointing out that they were prevented from occupying . . .” the lands.  Id. at 1407.  The 
Bureau of Land Management rejected the homestead applications of the plaintiffs in 1961.  Id. at 
1407-08.  In 1964 the United States patented all the lands not classified as powersites upon which 
the plaintiffs homesteaded to the plaintiffs in return for their “agreement to quit asserting claims 
to the classified lands.”  Id. at 1408.  While the government argued that, in light of this 
“compromise,” the plaintiffs should be estopped from claiming title to the classified tracts, the 
plaintiffs asserted there was no evidence indicating they entered into a compromise.  Id.  The 
court did not reach this issue directly on appeal.  Id. 
 209. See Lee, 809 F.2d at 1410 (discussing plaintiffs’ arguments that they were not barred by 
the Quiet Title Act’s disclaimer of interest provision). 
 210. See Lee v. United States, 629 F. Supp. 721, 734 (D. Alaska 1985). 
 211. Lee, 809 F.2d at 1411. 
 212. Id. at 1410-11 (citing Kale v. United States, 489 F.2d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1973)). 
 213. Id. at 1411. 
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In reaching its conclusion on indispensability, the court did not include a 
weighing of the Rule 19 factors in its analysis.214  The court did not specify the 
basis for its ruling.  The court did acknowledge, however, that upon different 
facts the United States might not have been indispensable.215 
C. Nichols v. Rysavy 
In Nichols v. Rysavy, the court ruled the United States was an 
indispensable party after considering the factors from Provident 
Tradesmens.216  The plaintiffs claimed that the fee simple patents their 
ancestors acquired from the United States were illegally issued.217  Due to the 
illegality of the patents, the plaintiffs argued, the subsequent transfers of the 
South Dakota property were void.218 
The patents at issue were of land originally allotted by the General 
Allotment Act and held in trust by the federal government.219  The Burke Act, 
passed by Congress in 1906, established a scheme under which Indians were 
presumed incompetent to hold the patents in fee until the Secretary of the 
Interior was “satisfied that [an] Indian allottee [was] competent and capable of 
managing his or her affairs.”220  The Burke Act shifted the burden of issuing 
fee patents from Congress to the Secretary of the Interior.221  Furthermore, the 
Secretary could now issue the fee patents before the trust period expired.222 
For the next ten years, Indians who applied and were deemed competent, 
“generally on the local Indian superintendent’s recommendation,”223 were 
granted fee patents before the trust period had fully run.  In 1916, this policy 
changed, and “competency commissions” would visit reservations and issue 
fee patents to allottees they determined were competent, whether or not the 
allottees had applied for a patent.224  This “forced fee patent” policy was 
 
 214. Id. (citing Nichols v. Rysavy, 809 F.2d 1317, 1331-34 (8th Cir. 1987)).  But see id. (“See 
generally Fed.R.Civ.P. [sic] 19(b).”). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Nichols, 809 F.2d at 1333-34. 
 217. Id. at 1320. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 1321.  For a description of the Indian General Allotment Act, see COHEN, supra 
note 1, at 130-38. 
 220. Nichols, 809 F.2d at 1321. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id.  One explanation for the shift in responsibility was that the Secretary of the Interior 
and the Indian Department “[knew] best when an Indian ha[d] reached such a stage of civilization 
as to be able and capable of managing his own affairs.”  Id. at 1322.  Another was that the Burke 
Act was “‘intended to accelerate the assimilation of the Indians . . . .’”  Id. (citing Nebraska v. 
Andrus, 586 F.2d 1212, 1219 (8th Cir. 1978)). 
 223. Id. at 1322. 
 224. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1374 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:1349 
 
intended to directly place the burden of independence on the Indians.225  The 
burden was cast even more directly in 1917 and 1919 when Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs Cato Sells’ declarations provided for the issuance of fee patents 
to adult Indians of the half-blood without investigation—their competence was 
presumed.226 
Due to these policies, “[t]housands of Indians in the western United States 
received forced fee patents, with primarily harsh results.”227  One court noted: 
Abuses were rampant: it is clear from the historical evidence that many patents 
were issued to Indians obviously incapable of taking on the burdens of 
unrestricted property ownership in the midst of a more sophisticated white 
society.  It is clear that some holders of these patents were cheated out of their 
land by speculators and merchants, and that some land was lost when the 
Indians sold or mortgaged it for money to pay state property taxes, taxes which 
could not be legally assessed . . . .228 
Others became aware of the abuses.  For example, Charles H. Burke, 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs of the incoming Harding Administration, 
abolished the forced fee and required application and competency 
examinations before patents would be issued.229  Later Congressional action 
returned patented lands to trust status and extended the trust period 
indefinitely.230 
After hearing these historical facts and wading through a number of 
jurisdictional statutes and analyzing whether the claim was barred due to a 
statute of limitations,231 the court concluded that the United States could not be 
sued and turned its attention to whether the federal government was an 
indispensable party.232  The court noted that in its ruling on indispensability it 
would be mindful of Provident Tradesmens233 and acknowledged the Supreme 
Court’s “reject[ion of] an inflexible and formulistic approach to joinder 
problems.”234 
 
 225. Nichols, 809 F.2d at 1322. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 1322-23 (quoting Bordeaux v. Hunt, 621 F. Supp. 637, 640 (D.S.D. 1985)). 
 229. Id. at 1323. 
 230. Nichols, 809 F.2d at 1323.  Ultimately less than 500 forced fee patents were returned to 
trust status under these statutes.  Id. 
 231. The court considered, inter alia, 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (providing a six-year statute of 
limitations for suits against the United States), the Quiet Title Act and the Indian Claims 
Limitation Act of 1982.  Nichols, 809 F.2d at 1323-31. 
 232. Id. at 1331-34. 
 233. Id. at 1332. 
 234. Id. 
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The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ interest in the forum weighed 
heavily in favor of the tribe.235  It noted that “‘better joinder’ in another forum 
would still be an impossibility regarding the United States,” since the 
principles regarding sovereign immunity would still apply.236  The court also 
considered the second and third Provident Tradesmens factors, regarding the 
defendant’s wish to avoid multiple litigation and the interests of the outsider 
who might be joined.237  While noting that “the government’s liability cannot 
be tried ‘behind its back’”238 and pointing out circumstances where the United 
States did not need to be a party,239 the court distinguished the case before it.  
It explained that the claim was based on the argument that the government 
wrongfully issued the patents and, as such, directly implicated the actions of 
the United States.240  The court did not directly address the multiple liability 
threat to the defendants other than the United States.241 
In its analysis of the fourth factor, the interest of the court and the public to 
complete, consistent and efficient settlement of controversies, the court 
considered the far-reaching effects of clouded real estate titles and the validity 
of fee patents issued by the United States: “If these fee patents can be 
successfully attacked, the entire United States title system is in jeopardy.”242  
The court noted that title insurance companies might face financial ruin and 
that land would be removed from the local tax base.243  In light of these 
catastrophic results, the court concluded that the fourth factor, as well as the 
combination of the other three, weighed in favor of dismissal.244 
D. Sokaogon Chippewa Community v. Wisconsin 
The Seventh Circuit was faced with the question of the United States’ 
indispensability in an Indian land claim in Sokaogon Chippewa v. 
Wisconsin.245  The plaintiff tribe’s complaint was founded on two treaties that 
had been signed by the United States in 1842 and 1854.246  The 1842 treaty 
ceded to the United States a large tract of land in return for “various promises 
 
 235. Id. 
 236. Nichols, 809 F.2d at 1332-33. 
 237. Id. at 1333. 
 238. Id. (quoting Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371, 375 (1945)). 
 239. Id. (explaining that where an Indian allottee did not receive his bargained-for 
consideration or where it was alleged that allotments were transferred by forged deeds, the 
“dispute[s] did not appropriately involve the United States”). 
 240. Id. 
 241. See Nichols, 809 F.2d at 1333. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. 879 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 246. Id. at 301. 
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and other consideration,” including “the right of hunting on the ceded territory, 
with the other usual privileges of occupancy, until required to remove by the 
President of the United States.”247  The court concluded that the plan was to 
eventually move the tribe west of the Mississippi River.248  Resistance to this 
plan, however, brought about a second treaty in 1854.249  This treaty promised 
the tribe “substantial land east as well as west of the Mississippi, including 
land in Wisconsin.”250  The land disputed by the plaintiff tribe in Sokaogon 
Chippewa was allegedly included in the land granted by the 1854 treaty.251 
Judge Posner, writing for the court, noted that the complaint alleged the 
United States “reneged on [its] promise” by not building a reservation for the 
tribe on the disputed tract.252  Although the tribe did not allege exactly when 
the United States “reneged” on its promise, the tribe’s complaint did claim that 
the Sokaogon lost possession of the tract within just a few decades of signing 
the treaties.253  Apart from the apparent violation of the 1854 treaty,254 because 
the United States did not satisfy a condition of the 1842 treaty, the tribe argued 
the right of occupancy conferred on the tribe never terminated.255  The tribe’s 
complaint also alleged the United States granted “mineral and other rights to 
various persons . . . in derogation of the tribe’s rights.”256 
The court quickly disposed of the matter of whether the tribe could sue the 
United States.  It held that because the tribe’s “cause of action against the U.S. 
must certainly have accrued well before August 13, 1946,” the critical date for 
claims brought before the ICC, it was too late to sue the federal government.257  
 
 247. Id. (emphasis original). 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 301. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 301-02. 
 253. Id. at 302. 
 254. See supra text accompanying note 250. 
 255. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 302.  See also supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
 256. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 302.  One of the named defendants was Exxon 
Corporation, who, it was alleged, had been exercising mineral rights in the disputed tract.  Id. at 
301. 
 257. Id. at 302. The tribe was unsuccessful in arguing that the United States should be 
estopped from pleading the ICC’s statute of limitations “because [the United States] interfered 
with the tribe’s obtaining adequate legal representation.”  Id.  The tribe’s complaint alleged the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs “encouraged the ‘agglomerating’ of all Chippewa claims into a single 
claim for presentation to the [ICC] and that the law firm picked by the Bureau . . . unaccountably 
failed to include the [tribe’s] claim.”  Id.  The court noted that for estoppel to apply there had to 
be some misconduct.  Id.  This misconduct, it noted, was not commitment by the Bureau, whose 
desire to pool claims was “reasonable and sensible,” but by the law firm.  Id. (noting that there 
may have been no misconduct by the firm, either).  The tribe was bound by the attorneys chosen 
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The tribe argued, however, that insofar as the 1842 treaty granted a right of 
use, rather than a right in fee simple, the cause of action did not accrue until 
1976, when defendant Exxon began fencing the land.258  The tribe further 
noted that the Quiet Title Act provided a twelve-year statute of limitations, 
which had not run when their suit was filed in 1986.259 
The court dismissed this argument, however, noting that the statute of 
limitations had run because, the court assumed, the tribe had discovered prior 
to Exxon’s activity on the land that the United States had asserted “in the tract 
inconsistent with the tribe’s occupancy rights.”260  In support of this, the court 
noted the existence of vacation homes and other private residential buildings 
which should have been sufficient evidence to the tribe that the United States 
“may at some time have infringed the Indians’ right of occupancy which had 
been reserved in the treaty.”261 
Finding that the district court had properly dismissed the United States, 
Judge Posner moved on to the issue of indispensability and whether the suit 
against the remaining defendants needed to be dismissed.262  The court noted 
the lack of case law on the standard of appellate review of a Rule 19(b) 
determination, but stated that most cases, including Provident Tradesmens263 
and a number of Seventh Circuit decisions, “implicitly treat[ed] appellate 
review as plenary.”264  Because the “finding of indispensability [was] so fell in 
its consequences,” the court declined to follow the narrow standard of review 
used in Navajo Tribe.265 
After establishing the plenary power of review of a ruling on 
indispensability, the court ruled that “[u]nder any standard, the district court’s 
determination that the U.S. is an indispensable party must be reversed . . . .”266  
 
by the Bureau because “Indian tribes are not permitted to make contracts that are not approved by 
the [Bureau,] . . . including contracts with attorneys.”  Id. 
 258. Id. at 302-03. 
 259. Id. at 303.  The court noted that the Quiet Title Act allowed the naming of the United 
States as a defendant in a real property dispute in which the government claimed an interest.  Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 303. 
 262. Id. 
 263. See supra Part III. 
 264. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 303.  Judge Posner noted the Tenth Circuit’s decision 
in Navajo Tribe, where the court stated that “since evaluation of indispensability ‘depends to a 
large degree on the careful exercise of discretion by the district court,’ we will only reverse a 
district court’s determination for abuse of discretion.”  Id. (citing Navajo Tribe v. New Mexico, 
809 F.2d 1455, 1471 (10th Cir. 1987)).  See also supra Part V.A. 
 265. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 304. 
 266. Id.  The court noted that “none of the considerations listed in the rule and elaborated in 
Provident Tradesmens or other cases provides any support for the district court’s determination.”  
Id. 
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The court explained how its analysis of the four factors from Provident 
Tradesmens led it to this conclusion.267  The plaintiff had “no other route for 
establishing its rights in the tract,”268 and the remaining defendants were not at 
risk of multiple liability.269  Furthermore, the court reasoned, the United States 
must not have feared the consequences of a judgment in the suit because it had 
“declined to take any position on its indispensability.”270  As for the fourth 
factor, the public’s interest in resolution, the court ruled that “public interest 
favors where possible the resolution of legal questions on the merits” and that 
it “also favors repose, but [that] this aspect . . . is secured by statutes of 
limitation.”271  The court stated that if “the Sokaogon have a good claim to this 
land, they ought not be barred from prosecuting it by their inability to sue an 
entity perhaps only remotely involved in their dispute with Exxon and the 
other occupiers.”272 
 
 267. See supra note 123 and accompanying text; supra Part III (describing the difference 
between the factors considered by the court in Navajo Tribe and those outlined in Provident 
Tradesmens). 
 268. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 304. 
 269. The court found the contrary to be true, noting that the defendants would have the 
opportunity to bring suit against the United States if, in fact, the defendants did lose the suit.  Id.  
The court expressed no view on the merits of such a charge against the United States but 
explained that because the nature of the Rule 19(b) inquiry involved a weighing of intangibles, 
the force of precedent was limited.  Id. 
  At this point the court strayed a bit from the Provident Tradesmen factors.  Here, the 
court examined the defendant’s risk of multiple liability, whereas in Provident Tradesmens, the 
Court’s second factor was the defendant’s risk of multiple litigation.  See supra note 139 and 
accompanying text.  The difference is worth noting, since multiple litigation is a possibility in 
situations where the threat of multiple liability is not present. 
 270. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 304. 
 271. Id.  The court later noted the interests of amici American Land Title Association about a 
suit which could “unsettle titles throughout a large tract of land.”  Id. at 305.  In response, the 
court stated that “many legal wrongs were done to the Indians, and the Supreme Court recently 
held that an Indian tribe could bring a suit to recover land conveyed to the State of New York 
almost two centuries ago.”  Id. (citing County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 
(1985)). 
 272. Id. at 304.  The court noted: 
To exaggerate slightly . . . it is as if every time someone claimed that someone else was 
encroaching on his property he would have to sue not only the alleged encroacher (here 
Exxon) but also the alleged encroacher’s predecessors in title right back to King James or 
Lord Baltimore (here in the U.S.).  So far as can be determined . . . the relationship of the 
U.S. to the Indians’ controversy with Exxon and the other occupiers of the land in 
derogation of the Indians’ alleged occupancy rights is that of a predecessor in title (to 
Exxon), no more. 
Id. at 304. 
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After distinguishing the case at bar from three cases holding the United 
States was indispensable,273 the court placed much emphasis on the failure of 
the United States to disclaim indispensability.274  While acknowledging the 
complaint’s allegation that “the U.S. made grants in derogation of the 
plaintiff’s treaty rights,”275 the court noted that the record was unclear on when 
and to whom these grants were made and ruled that the district court would 
have to straighten out these matters on remand.276  In the end, the court found 
the United States to be merely a necessary, rather than an indispensable party. 
E. Reconciling the Circuit Split 
Sokaogon Chippewa’s outcome differs significantly from that in Navajo 
Tribe, Lee and Nichols.  In Sokaogon Chippewa, the court recognized the 
precarious position in which Indian litigants are placed and applied the 
Provident Tradesmens process to reach an outcome that allowed the tribe’s 
action to proceed. 
The facts of the cases also provide some evidence of why there was a 
difference in outcomes.  In Sokaogon Chippewa, the court noted what might be 
the most significant factor distinguishing these cases: the United States’ 
interest.277  In Navajo Tribe, the United States itself claimed the land in 
question.278  The United States made no such claim to the disputed land in 
Sokaogon Chippewa.  In Lee and Nichols, the government was subject to 
potential liability.279  In Sokaogon Chippewa, Judge Posner noted that if the 
United States had any fear of liability it likely would have expressed an 
opinion regarding whether it was indispensable.280 
It seems logical that the nature of the disputed land might have influenced 
the outcome of the cases.  In Navajo Tribe, Lee and Nichols the disputed land 
was located in relatively desolate areas: New Mexico, Alaska and South 
Dakota.281  The tract of land considered in Sokaogon Chippewa, however, was 
further east, in Wisconsin, where the population density was likely higher.  
 
 273. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 304-05 (discussing Navajo Tribe, Lee and Nichols).  
The court distinguished these cases on the grounds that in two of the cases the United States was 
“clearly exposed to potential liability” and that in the third “property rights claimed by the U.S. 
were in jeopardy.”  Id. 
 274. Id. at 305. 
 275. Id.  The Sokaogon Chippewa court’s reasoning differs from the Nichols court’s by 
holding that the “directness” of the claim regarding the United States’ actions was not sufficient 
to merit finding the United States indispensable.  See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
 276. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 305. 
 277. See supra note 273. 
 278. See Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 305. 
 279. See id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. The opinions in these cases give no description of the disputed land. 
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Furthermore, the presence of copper and zinc on the land made its value 
substantial.282  Judge Posner directly confronted the concerns of the American 
Land Title Association regarding the ruling’s potential effect on land titles 
throughout the region.283  His dismissal of the Association’s concerns 
demonstrated his willingness to look around the characteristics of the land to 
allow the tribe’s litigation to continue.  Ultimately, however, the outcomes 
defy common sense; the suit disputing title to the more valuable land was 
allowed to continue and those to the more desolate lands were halted. 
The difference in these cases may also boil down to the strength of the 
interests the Indian-claimants held.  In Lee and Nichols, the Indians claimed 
title through congressional enactments.284  In Navajo Tribe, the plaintiffs’ 
claim was based on executive orders.285  In Sokaogon Chippewa, however, the 
claim was founded on treaties between the plaintiff tribe and the United 
States.286  The court may have held the interests the tribe acquired through the 
treaty with the United States higher than those acquired through legislation or 
executive order.  Unfortunately, the opinions shed little light on this score. 
It is possible other factors contributed to the different rulings by the 
Navajo Tribe, Lee, Nichols and Sokaogon Chippewa courts.  These decisions 
illustrate, however, that the four factors of the indispensability analysis leave 
courts ample room to entertain myriad considerations. 
F. The Miami Claim 
In 1795, the United States signed the Treaty of Greenville with a number 
of Indian tribes in the Northwest Territory.287  The purpose of the treaty was 
“[t]o put an end to destructive war, to settle all controversies, and to restore 
harmony and a friendly intercourse” between the United States and the 
signatory tribes.288  The treaty established “a boundary line between what 
would be considered United States lands to which Indian title had been 
relinquished and what would be considered remaining Indian lands, the title to 
 
 282. Sokaogon Chippewa, 879 F.2d at 301.  Although the court recognized that the land was 
rural, it acknowledged the presence of “federal and state public lands . . . vacation homes, farms, 
and other private residences.”  Id. 
 283. Id. Title insurance companies filed amicus briefs with the court in Nichols, as well.  See 
Nichols v. Rysavy, 809 F.2d 1317, 1320 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 284. See generally supra Part V.B, C. 
 285. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 286. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. 
 287. Treaty with the Wyandots, 7 Stat. 49 (1795).  Parties to this treaty included the 
Wyandots, Delawares, Shawanese, Ottawas, Chippewas, Pottawatomies, Miamis, Eel River, 
Weas, Kickapoos, Piankashaws, and Kaskaskia.  Id. 
 288. Id. 
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which had been recognized and not relinquished.”289  In essence, the United 
States recognized that a great deal of the “Northwest” was the possession of 
Indians, but did not attempt to specifically recognize which tribe possessed 
which parcel of land until a later time.290  In return for this recognition, the 
Indians ceded to the United States much of present-day Ohio. 
The federal government signed the Treaty of Grouseland291 with the Miami 
Indians ten years after the Treaty of Greenville to resolve the issue of which 
lands specifically belonged to the Miami.292  The Miami claimed that in the 
Treaty of Grouseland the government recognized the Miami “as having 
exclusive title, ownership and right to possession of . . . the Wabash 
Watershed . . . .”293  The language of the treaty appears to confirm this.294  The 
tribe claimed that because the United States never “adopt[ed] a treaty or 
convention as federal law required,” the tribe retains treaty-recognized title to 
the Wabash Watershed lands in Illinois.295 
In June of 2000 the Miami filed suit in the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Illinois against twenty-five landowners in fifteen 
different counties in east-central Illinois.296  The tribe sought declaration of its 
treaty-recognized title to the land, possession of the land, and damages “for the 
period during which it was unlawfully deprived of possession.”297  The tribe 
claimed rightful title to the disputed land under the Greenville and Grouseland 
treaties. 
 
 289. Complaint for Possession of Indian Tribal Lands, Damages and Declaratory Judgment, 
Miami Tribe of Okla. v. Walden, No. 00-cv-4142-JPG, ¶6 (S.D. Ill. filed June 2, 2000) 
[hereinafter Miami Complaint]. 
 290. See id. 
 291. Treaty of Grouseland, 7 Stat. 91 (1805). 
 292. See Miami Complaint ¶¶1, 7-8. 
 293. Miami Complaint ¶8. 
 294. Treaty of Grouseland, 7 Stat. 91, Art. IV (1805). 
[I]n order to quiet their minds on that head, the United States do hereby engage to 
consider them as joint owners of all the country on the Wabash and its waters, above the 
Vincennes tract, and which has not been ceded to the United States, by this or any former 
treaty; and they do farther engage that they will not purchase any part of the said country 
without the consent of each of the said tribes.  Provided always, That nothing in this 
section contained, shall in any manner weaken or destroy any claim which the Kickapoos, 
who are not represented at this treaty, may have to the country they now occupy on the 
Vermillion river. 
Id.  at 91-92 (emphasis original).  It is likely one of the disputed issues in the Miami litigation, 
should the case reach trial on the merits, will be the meaning of “the Wabash and its waters.” 
 295. Miami Complaint ¶11. 
 296. See id. ¶¶1-3.  The State of Illinois was not named a defendant. 
 297. Memorandum of Plaintiff in Opposition to Motion of the State of Illinois to Intervene for 
the Limited Purpose of Moving to Dismiss, Miami Tribe of Okla. v. Walden, No. 00-cv-4142-
JPG (S.D. Ill. filed June 2, 2000) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Opposition to State’s Intervention]. 
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In August of 2000, the State of Illinois filed a Motion to Intervene for the 
Limited Purpose of Moving to Dismiss (State’s Motion).298  In the State’s 
Motion, Illinois asserted that the suit threatened its “sovereignty and 
jurisdiction over, and thus its power to regulate and tax, activities on the 
tracts . . . .”299  The State’s Motion also noted that the Miami’s complaint 
“attacks the actions of the United States government.”300  Illinois argued that 
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the suit because of the 
sovereign immunity of the State and the federal government and that, because 
itself and the United States were indispensable parties, the suit must therefore 
be dismissed.301  The United States did not assert a position with respect to its 
indispensability in the Miami litigation.  On March 30, 2001 the State’s Motion 
was granted and Illinois was allowed to intervene. 
Had the suit not been dismissed, the court would have had to apply the 
Provident Tradesmens factors to determine whether the United States was, as 
Illinois argued, an indispensable party.  The first factor, the plaintiff’s interest 
in the forum, weighed heavily in favor of a ruling that the United States was 
not an indispensable party.  The Miami had a great interest in the suit’s 
proceeding in federal court since no other forum was available. 
In the State’s Motion, Illinois offered Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of 
Idaho302 as support for the argument that were the Miami to succeed and be 
granted title to the lands they seek, Illinois’ sovereignty interests and Eleventh 
Amendment protections would be jeopardized.303  In Coeur d’Alene, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that “[s]tates have real and vital interests in 
preferring their own forum in suits brought against them . . . .”304  Hence, the 
Court refused to allow the suit to continue under the Ex parte Young 
 
 298. See Motion of the State of Illinois to Intervene for the Limited Purpose of Moving to 
Dismiss, Miami, No. 00-cv-4142-JPG [hereinafter State’s Motion to Intervene].  This motion also 
presented the issue whether Illinois could intervene in the suit without waiving its sovereign 
immunity.  In an October 19, 2000 Order, the court invited Illinois to show cause why the court 
should not deny its motion to intervene for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
 299. State’s Motion to Intervene ¶1.  The State identified no property interest that was 
threatened by the suit.  See generally State’s Motion to Intervene. 
 300. State’s Motion to Intervene ¶2. 
 301. Id. 
 302. 521 U.S. 261 (1997). 
 303. Motion of the State of Illinois to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Miami 
Tribe of Okla. v. Walden, No. 00-cv-4142-JPG (S.D. Ill. filed June 2, 2000)  [hereinafter State’s 
Motion to Dismiss].  One of the potential confusions in the State’s motion was its reference to 
“sovereign immunity” and “sovereign interests.”  “Sovereign immunity” likely refers to the 
Eleventh Amendment concerns, while “sovereign interests” implicated the State’s alleged 
interests in taxing and regulating land within its borders.  See generally id. 
 304. Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 274. 
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exception,305 noting that the Idaho state courts would provided “an adequate 
judicial forum.”306 
Unlike the plaintiff tribe in Coeur d’Alene, the Miami had no alternative 
forum in their case.  Although the Illinois state courts exercise general 
jurisdiction,307 Illinois could not be made a party or defendant without its 
consent,308 and the state had given its consent to suit only under very narrow 
circumstances, none of which opened the state courts to the Miami’s claim.309 
Apart from the question whether an alternative forum is available, 
however, is that of the proper method of analyzing the first factor.  When the 
Nichols court considered the first of the Provident Tradesmens factors, access 
to an alternate forum, the court held that no other forum would provide for 
“better joinder.”310  Structuring the analysis in this manner—asking whether 
“better joinder” of the United States was available elsewhere, rather than 
whether any forum is available if the party is joined—limits the impact of this 
consideration when confronted with the potential joinder of the United States.  
Due to the federal government’s sovereign immunity, which applies in all 
forums, there will be no forum for “better joinder.”311  The proper inquiry to 
make is whether the suit could be brought elsewhere.  If the answer is no, the 
factor weighs against a ruling of indispensability.  By altering the wording of 
the first factor, the Nichols court substantially tilted the balance in favor of an 
indispensability ruling. 
The application of the first Provident Tradesmens factor differed 
significantly in Sokaogon Chippewa from that employed in Nichols.  In 
Sokaogon Chippewa, Judge Posner explained that the plaintiff tribe had “no 
other route for establishing its rights . . . .”312  Considering the first factor in 
this manner favors plaintiffs; where “better joinder” is possible, the suit may be 
refiled after dismissal.  Where “better joinder” is not available, the factor 
weighs against a ruling of indispensability as it did in Sokaogon Chippewa.313  
Ultimately for the Miami, the unavailability of an alternative forum for the 
 
 305. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 149, at 412-16. 
 306. Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 274. 
 307. The state courts may adjudicate any matter coming to them at common law, as well as 
those over which they are given jurisdiction by statute.  In re Schauberger, 624 N.E.2d 863, 869 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993).  See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9. 
 308. See ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 4; 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1 (2000). 
 309. Actions may be brought against the State pursuant to the Illinois Public Labor Relations 
Act and the Court of Claims Act.  See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1 (2000). 
 310. See supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
 311. See supra Part IV. 
 312. See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
 313. It can also be argued the failure of the United States to assert a position with respect to 
its indispensability played a significant role in the Seventh Circuit’s holding.  See supra note 270 
and accompanying text. 
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plaintiff tribe would have weighed heavily in favor of a ruling that the United 
States was not an indispensable party. 
The second and third Provident Tradesmens factors also would have 
counseled a ruling that the United States was not an indispensable party.  
Illinois had not identified any risk the defendant landowners faced for multiple 
litigation.314  As for the interests of the party to be joined, the United States had 
not asserted a position with respect to its indispensability so, as Judge Posner 
noted in Sokaogon Chippewa, the United States “must not fear the 
consequences of a judgment in this suit.”315 
In considering the fourth factor, the interest of the courts and the public to 
complete settlement of controversies, the Nichols court noted the potential 
effect of clouded real estate titles, which would affect “real estate transactions, 
probate proceedings, and credit availability.”316  The significant amount of 
land at stake in Miami may have provided the court the leverage it needed to 
rule that the United States was an indispensable party based solely on this 
fourth factor.  It is difficult to fathom, however, how a court could make an 
indispensability determination “in equity and good conscience,” as demanded 
by Rule 19, without also considering, under the fourth factor, the historical 
injustices suffered by the Miami.317 
Although there may be room to argue that a weighing of the Provident 
Tradesmens factors produces no clear result, the court may not have been 
forced to make such a determination.  In the State’s Motion, Illinois failed to 
allege facts and circumstances necessary for an indispensability ruling.318 
In the State’s Motion, Illinois argued that the court 
 
 314. See Memorandum in Support of the State of Illinois’ Motion to Dismiss, Miami Tribe of 
Okla. v. Walden, No. 00-cv-4142-JPG (S.D. Ill. filed June 2, 2000).  It is possible, however, that 
were the defendant landowners found liable, they might choose to proceed against the United 
States and Illinois. 
 315. Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Wisconsin, 879 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 316. Nichols v. Rysavy, 809 F.2d 1317, 1333 (8th Cir. 1987). Although the Navajo Tribe 
court considered a formulation of the indispensability analysis which left out the consideration of 
this factor, it was conscious of the “in equity and good conscience” standard under which the 
indispensability determination should be made.  Navajo Tribe v. New Mexico, 809 F.2d 1455, 
1473 (10th Cir. 1987). 
 317. In Sokaogon Chippewa the court was sensitive to the interests of the plaintiff tribe.  
Although it mentioned the potential disruption to real estate titles voiced by amicus American 
Land Title Association, it countered this by acknowledging that “on the other hand many legal 
wrongs were done to the Indians.” Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Wisconsin, 879 F.2d 300, 305 
(7th Cir. 1989). 
 318. The following analysis is based on the motion to dismiss filed with the State’s Motion.  
See State’s Motion to Dismiss.  Illinois’ motion to dismiss filed after its motion to intervene was 
granted was likewise deficient in its failure to address the indispensability factors as set forth in 
Provident Tradesmens and as applied in Sokaogon Chippewa. 
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lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the [Miami’s] complaint attacks the 
actions of the United States government.  This Court has no jurisdiction to 
review the validity of those actions because the United States has sovereign 
immunity, and has not consented to be sued in this Court.  The United States is 
therefore an indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, and 
the [Miami’s] action cannot go forward against the existing defendants because 
the United States’ conduct cannot be tried in its absence.319 
Illinois further claimed that “[w]ithout the United States’ participation as a 
defendant, the Miami’s claims against the existing defendants in this case must 
be dismissed because the United States is a ‘necessary’ and ‘indispensable’ 
party to this action under [Rule 19].”320  This conclusion is the result of an 
improper formulation of the process set forth in Provident Tradesmens for the 
proper determination of indispensability. 
The equation argued by Illinois was that because 1) the suit implicates past 
federal action and 2) the United States cannot be sued, 3) the federal 
government is therefore an indispensable party.321  A proper argument would 
have been that 1) the interests of the United States in this case are great and 
therefore 2) it is a necessary party who should be joined if possible, but 3) 
because of sovereign immunity they cannot be joined so 4) due to the 
overwhelming weight of the Provident Tradesmens factors, the United States is 
indispensable and the suit must be dismissed. 
Illinois’ argument represents the type of reasoning the Supreme Court 
sought to discourage by its holding in Provident Tradesmens.322  The issue of 
sovereign immunity should not be raised until the court has determined that 
Illinois is a necessary party under Rule 19(a).323  If the court concluded that the 
United States was a necessary party, then it would proceed to the 
indispensability analysis.  Only in the context of considering indispensability 
would the court consider the acts of the federal government, whether the suit 
would amount to a review of its conduct and, finally, whether sovereign 
immunity bars joinder. 
To declare that the federal government was indispensable merely because 
its actions were implicated and sovereign immunity protected it would be to 
ignore the process mandated by Provident Tradesmens.  There, the Court noted 
that “whether a particular lawsuit must be dismissed in the absence of [a 
person] can only be determined in the context of [the] particular litigation.”324  
 
 319. State’s Motion to Intervene ¶2. 
 320. State’s Motion to Dismiss ¶8. 
 321. See id. 
 322. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 118 (1968). 
 323. See supra Part III.B. 
 324. Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 118. 
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Illinois linked the Miami’s claims to action of the federal government only 
briefly: 
[T]he United States entered into the Treaty of Grouseland with the Tribe, 
admitted the State of Illinois into the Union under its current borders in 1818, 
disposed of the claims urged by the Miami in treaties ratified after the Treaty 
of Grouseland, and issued federal fee patents to the land claimed by the 
Tribe.325 
Illinois alleged no other basis, apart from the United States’ sovereign 
immunity, upon which to base a ruling that the United States is 
indispensable.326 
Illinois’ suggestions ignored the four factors set forth in Provident 
Tradesmens.  The State did not address the Miami’s interest in the forum, the 
defendant landowners’ potential for multiple litigation, the United States’ 
failure to assert a position with respect to its indispensability, or the interests of 
the public regarding the settlement of this controversy.327  Illinois’ apparent 
belief that the mention of federal action coupled with the existence of federal 
sovereign immunity would be enough to trigger a declaration of 
indispensability ignores the fact that a court “does not know whether a 
particular person is ‘indispensable’ until it ha[s] examined the situation to 
determine whether it can proceed without him.”328 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Courts seeking to apply Provident Tradesmens properly in Indian land 
claims should focus on the third and fourth factors: the interests of the United 
States and the interests of the public in complete, consistent and efficient 
settlement of controversies.329  Courts should also be sensitive about the 
historical connection between the United States and Indians and should make 
an informed ruling that takes into account the circumstances in which Indians 
often involuntarily found themselves. 
Questioning the United States’ interests allows courts to evaluate whether 
the federal government would be harmed through joinder.330  If the United 
States asserts its indispensability, and the court so rules, the Indian claimants 
may eventually be relegated to petitioning Congress for an express waiver of 
 
 325. State’s Motion to Dismiss ¶8. 
 326. See State’s Motion to Intervene. 
 327. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 328. Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 119. 
 329. Indeed, these are the factors on which the Sokaogon Chippewa court focused primarily.  
See supra Part V.D. 
 330. The Provident Tradesmens court also focused on the third factor.  See supra note 141 
and accompanying text. 
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sovereign immunity or some other legislative action that can address the tribe’s 
claim.  Although this delays satisfaction,331 or at least adjudication, of the 
tribe’s claim, pursuing political avenues has produced results.332  Where the 
United States expresses no opinion with respect to its indispensability, 
however, as in Sokaogon Chippewa, the court should recognize the United 
States’ desire that it not block the plaintiff tribe’s litigation.  In this way the 
fourth factor, the public’s concern for efficient adjudication, is also satisfied 
because the suit will proceed and move further toward resolution. 
The fourth factor is also a proper one upon which courts should focus 
because it allows for the injection of the factual peculiarities of each case.  This 
factor permits courts to consider general notions of fairness, as the Sokaogon 
Chippewa opinion acknowledged with respect to the great injustices visited 
upon American Indians.333  Conversely, but equally important, this factor 
demands courts not ignore the interests of the current landowners. 
A proper indispensability analysis should also lend appropriate weight to 
the United States’ historically significant role in Indian affairs.  The mere 
appearance of a connection between the United States’ interests and the 
plaintiff tribe’s litigation should not persuade courts to depart from a full 
analysis as required by Provident Tradesmens.334 
The nexus between the plaintiff and third party that makes a typical third 
party indispensable may not, upon proper application of Provident 
Tradesmens, make the United States an indispensable party in an Indian land 
claim.  This is so because Provident Tradesmens requires courts to consider the 
availability of another forum to the plaintiff.  Thus, even where those arguing 
the United States is indispensable can show the necessary factual nexus 
between the United States and the plaintiff tribe, courts’ analysis of the 
availability of another forum for the plaintiff may result in a ruling that the 
United States is not indispensable. When courts adhere to Provident 
Tradesmens, even in the face of significant links between the United States’ 
interests and those of the litigants, the ruling on indispensability will be made 
properly. 
While minimizing the harsh results procedural hurdles can produce in 
Indian land claims is a worthwhile goal, especially due to the often-
overwhelming substantive challenges faced by the claimants, this alone is no 
basis to rule a party is not indispensable. Sensitivity to the concerns of Indian 
 
 331. This sort of delay produces unattractive results for others, as well.  Landowners in the 
claim area may be confronted with significant frustration regarding the legitimacy of their title. 
 332. Lobbying of this sort was, after all, the catalyst for passage of the ICCA.  See supra Part 
II.D (discussing the ICCA). 
 333. See supra note 271. 
 334. This was one of the deficiencies in the State’s Motion to Intervene in Miami.  See supra 
Part V.F. 
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land claimants, however, when combined with the potentially great unrest such 
a claim can cause surrounding landowners, favors the resolution of Indian land 
claims sooner rather than later.  Courts that are faithful to Provident 
Tradesmens by making a proper indispensability analysis will not only settle 
unrest regarding these claims, but will also ensure that the courts are not 
responsible for yet another injustice to be borne by American Indians. 
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